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EDUCATIONAL MALFEASANCE: A NEW
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO
EDUCATE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, increasing public dissatisfaction with this nation's
educational systems has stimulated a move to find redress in the court-
room.' Frustrated plaintiffs who believe the schools have failed in their
duty to educate children have become increasingly aware of the possi-
bility of a legal remedy for their grievances,2 and at least two lawsuits
have been brought for failure to educate. 3 Even though both failed for
lack of a recognizable cause of action, they represent the early develop-
ment of a tort of educational malfeasance.4
This comment will examine the issues presented in these cases and
attempt to predict the future of similar actions. An analysis will be
made of the courts' reasoning in both cases, and an examination of
recent legislative and educational trends towards accountability and
competency-based programs will be made to determine their possible
effect on suits for failure to educate.
I. For a general discussion of this trend to sue schools and their employees, see R. STRICK-
LAND, J. PHILLIPS, & W. PHILLIPS, AVOIDING TEACHER MALPRACTICE 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as R. STRICKLAND]. Historically, these suits have been personal injury actions. For a collection of
assorted cases, see Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 1163 (1953) and Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 489 (1962). See
also Ripps, The Tort Liability of the Classroom Teacher, 9 AKRON L. REv. 19 (1975); Seitz, Legal
Responsibility Under Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districts as Regards Negligent Con-
duct Toward Pupils, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 495 (1964). Cf. Owen, Tort Liability in German School
Law, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1955). Nevertheless, recovery for failure to instruct has
been permitted where physical injury also resulted. See, e.g., La Valley v. Stanford, 272 App. Div.
183, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 460 (1947) (physical education teacher held liable for injuries plaintiff received
in a boxing match after the teacher failed to instruct in defensive measures).
2. The question of sovereign immunity generally is beyond the scope of this paper, and it
will be presumed in the following discussion that suits are not barred for that reason. Indeed, a
majority of states have waived their sovereign immunity. Ripps, supra note 1, at 20. Only a few
states, however, provide statutes allowing direct actions against school districts for damages
caused by their boards, officers, agents, and employees. Id For a brief history of sovereign im-
munity as applied to school districts, see Note, Torts-Immunity-School District Liablefor Torts
of Employees, 46 IowA L. REv. 196 (1960). See generally Linn, Tort Liability and the Schools, 43
N.D.L. REv. 765 (1967); Mancke, Liability of School Districts for the Negligent Acts of Their
Employees, I J.L. & EDUC. 109 (1972).
3. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
4. Misfeasance, malfeasance, and malpractice are used interchangeably in this article. Since
no name has been given to the cause of action discussed here, any of the above could be used.
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A. Historical Background
Providing a general educational opportunity for all children has
not always been primarily the function of government. In this coun-
try's early history, the family assumed the major responsibility for pre-
paring a child to become a productive member of society, and
government had little or no concern with education and educational
policies.' The industrial revolution brought increased demands for an
educational system that could adequately train children for more com-
plex tasks.' State and local governments gradually assumed the task of
providing compulsory, tax-supported school systems to better serve this
need.7 Public schools became the principal dispensers of knowledge
and the importance of their role in society grew.
Today, even the Supreme Court has recognized that education has
become one of the most significant functions of government.8 Society's
recognition of the enormous benefits of providing children with a stim-
ulating educational background has placed growing responsibilities on
the school systems.9 Schools have not always been able to keep pace
with the public's demands. The tense relationship which has subse-
quently developed between the public and the schools is one reason
frustrated parents and students have turned to the courts for relief. 10
5. J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as J. HOGAN]. Educational responsibilities of parents and of the state are discussed in Com-
ment, The Right to Education: .4 ConstitutionalAnalysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796, 799-801 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as The Right to Education].
6. J. HOGAN, supra note 5, at 1.
7. Id See also Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REV. 623
(1975).
8. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court, in an oft-quoted segment of its
opinion, stated:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic soci-
ety. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education.
Id. at 493. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ser-
rano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Tribe, The Supreme Court
1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protec-
tion-Property Taxes as a Method of Funding Public Education, 7 AKRON L. REV. 151 (1973);
Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 519 (1974); Symposium-Public SchoolFinancing and Serrano v. Priest, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 421 (1977).
9. J. HOGAN, supra note 5, at 4. "Since schools exist to convey to youngsters certain knowl-
edge, skills, and attitudes deemed necessary to help them develop as individuals and become
contributing members of society, the learning experiences afforded children under the aegis of the
school are a paramount concern of government." Reutter, The Law and the Curriculum, 20 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 91, 91 (1955).
10. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 1, at 6.
[Vol. 14:338
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B. The Court's Role
As the concept of education has changed in its relationship to the
public interest, so has the role of the court changed in its relationship to
education."I Policy decisions on educational issues have been devised
The fundamental purpose of civil litigation has always been to prevent or redress
civil wrongs. In the United States, the law contemplates that when a person believes he
has been wronged, or is about to be wronged, he may go into court and attempt to
forestall the threatened wrong or seek relief from the wrong actually visited upon him by
another. Regardless of whether the defendant in civil litigation was a person or a gov-
ernmental or business entity, the courts are always willing to consider the plaintiff's
claims and, where meritorious and not subject to some exemption by a rule of law, they
have enjoined the future wrong or redressed the past one.
Thus, public schools in America have never been exempt from having to defend
against lawsuits, although in some cases relevant rules of law, which restricted tort liabil-
ity, protected the school boards' legislative discretionary authority against encroachment
by the judiciary, placed severe limitations on school boards in the delegation of their
legislative powers to school employees, or gave judicial sanction to a "hands-off'
attitude fostered by the principle of in loco parentis, did limit the sanctions actually im-
posed. The limited relief granted some plaintiffs in civil suits brought against the public
schools in years past undoubtedly did have a deterrent effect on litigation, but enough
was directed against them over the decades to make them no strangers in the courtroom.
However, since 1954 and the landmark racial desegregation case of Brown v. Board
o/Education, a profound change has occurred in the courts' attitude toward public edu-
cation in the United States. It is still evolving in a manner so pervasive that virtually
every facet of public education is significantly affected.
In recent years. . . factors have combined to change the attitude of the courts
toward local public education. This has brought a corollary change in the approach of
citizens who would resort to the judicial processes to solve disputes with the--public
schools. The fundamental emphasis in filing civil suits against the public schools has
switched from seeking relief or redress of an alleged wrong to establishing and creating
new law. Hence, a significant number of lawsuits now filed in the United States against
the public schools are designed to put the judiciary in the position of creating new legal
rights affecting public education, which state and local bodies will have to honor. And
with this new design have come new tactics which plaintiffs use in imposing their views
on, or enforcing their rights against, public school boards.
Shannon, The New Tactics Used by Plaintiffis in Imposing Their Views on, or Enforcing Their Rights
Against, Public School Boards-A Commentary, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 77, 77-80 (1973) (footnote omit-
ted). The author reviews these tactics and concludes that they are neither "good" nor "bad" but
the "tactics must be understood if school people are to provide their best and most effective partic-
ipation in the continuing process of reshaping democracy to meet the changing conditions success-
fully." Id. at 87.
11. J. HOGAN, supra note 5, at 5-6. In discussing the evolution of educational jurisprudence,
Hogan categorizes the role of the courts in five stages: (1) the stage of strict judicial laissez faire
(1789-1850) when courts generally ignored education; (2) the stage of state control of education
(1850-1950) when state courts decided most educational questions; (3) the reformation stage
(1950-present) when federal courts began to recognize that educational policies and practices were
not in conformity with the federal constitution; (4) the stage of "education under supervision of
the courts" (1950-present) when the tendency of the courts has been to expand their powers over
schools, establishing a new judicial function; and (5) the stage of "strict construction" (March 21,
1973-present) when the courts have looked carefully at a constitutional basis for education cases.
Id. See also Rist & Anson, Social Science and the Judicial Process in Education Cases, An Intro-
duction: Dimensions and Implications of the Increasing Role of the Courts in the Formulation of
Educational Policy, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1977); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the
Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv. 411 (1973).
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more frequently by the courts,12 and judges have been required to
make broad reforms in the formulation of educational policy.' 3 Courts
have become more willing to involve themselves with educational mat-
ters and educators have appeared powerless to alter the trend. 4 Legal
remedies are thus one of the growing number of reform movements
taking place in the operation of public schools. The implications and
dimensions of this greater judicial involvement must be considered in
an examination of the specific problem of educational malfeasance.
II. RECENT CASES-ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A TORT
A California case, Peter W. v. San Francisco Un~fled School
District,15 is generally considered to be the first major case dealing with
the issue of educational malpractice. 6 The eighteen year old plaintiff
had graduated from a high school in the defendant school district, hav-
ing been enrolled in its schools for twelve years. He claimed that the
school district, through its negligent acts and omissions, had breached
both its common law and statutory duties to educate him and that he
had suffered damages for which he should be compensated.' 7 The
plaintiff further alleged that liability could also be based on a theory of
intentional misrepresentation or fraud.'8 The court's analysis and sub-
sequent dismissal of these tort claims provide an important basis for a
study of the issues involved in educational malpractice problems.
The plaintiff's first count of negligence in Peter W. stated that the
school district had
negligently and carelessly failed to provide plaintiff with ade-
quate instruction, guidance, counseling, and/or supervision in
basic academic skills such as reading and writing, although
12. Wise, The Hyper-rationalization of American Education, 35 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 354
(1978).
13. J. HOGAN, supra note 5, at 12. "The courts have indicated a growing willingness to in-
volve themselves in school and college problems. This is a change in judicial philosophy from the
prior 'hands-off' attitude; schools are now aware of the potential answerability to the court system
and must adjust institutional conduct accordingly." Ripps, supra note 1, at 31. See generally
Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REv. 428 (1977).
14. "A teacher, like every other member of society, should be held accountable for his negli-
gent torts... [including] failing to instruct." Dugan, Teacher's Tort Liability, I I CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 512, 520 (1962). For an overview of education issues that have been litigated, see E. REUT-
TER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); M. SORGEN, P. DUFFY, W.
KAPLIN, & E. MARGOLIN, STATE, SCHOOL, AND FAMILY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
EDUCATION (1973).
15. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
16. Saretsky, The Strangely Signiflcant Case of Peter Doe, 54 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 589 (1973).
Peter Doe was later changed to Peter W. in the style of the case.
17. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
18. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
[Vol. 14:338
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said school district had the authority, responsibility and abil-
ity . . . [to do so]. . . . Defendant school district, its agents
and employees, negligently failed to use reasonable care in
the discharge of its duties to provide plaintiff with adequate
instruction. . . in basic academic skills and failed to exercise
that degree of professional skill required of an ordinary pru-
dent educator under the same circumstances .... t9
The allegations also listed specific acts exemplifying the district's fail-
ure to meet its duty and stated other facts necessary to satisfy the re-
quired elements of negligence, including proximate cause, injury, and
damages.20 The court ignored those elements and focused exclusively
upon whether the facts alleged were sufficient to show that the defend-
ant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care. The plaintiff argued that his
status as a student in the defendant school system was enough to show
the requisite duty of care.2' The court responded by saying that
no reasonable observer would be heard to say that these facts
did not impose upon defendants a "duty of care" within any
common meaning of the term: given the commanding impor-
tance of public education in society, we state a truism in re-
marking that the public authorities who are dutybound to
educate are also dutybound to do it with "care." But the tru-
ism does not answer the present inquiry, in which "duty of
care" is not a term of common parlance; it is instead a legalis-
tic concept of "duty" which will sustain liability for negli-
gence in its breach, and it must be analyzed in that light.22
In its subsequent refusal to recognize the existence of such a duty
in the defendant, the court used public policy considerations as a basis
for its rationale. Citing Raymond v. Paradise Unfted School District,23
19. Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (alterations and omissions by the court).
20. Id. at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857. In explaining the California formula for a negligence
cause of action, the court cited 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PLEADING § 450, at 2103 (2d
ed. 1971).
21. The plaintiff argued that his enrollment established a duty of care in the school district
under any of the following theories: (1) that the school district had "assumed" the function of
instruction and a resulting duty to exercise reasonable care in the discharge of that function, (2)
that the special relationship between students and teachers supports a duty to exercise reasonable
care, and (3) that a duty to exercise reasonable care in instruction and supervision is recognized in
California. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
The cases cited by the plaintiff in each of these arguments were dismissed by the court as
inapplicable since they concerned either rights and duties for physical care or equal protection
privileges, distinguishing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601,487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 89
Cal. Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360 (1970). See also note 92 infra.
22. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
23. 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963). Of the numerous policy arguments stated in
this case for determining duty, Id. at 7, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 851, the judges in Peter W. seemed most
1978]
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Rowland v. Christian,4 and Dean Prosser, 5 the court reasoned that
public policy factors could be used to support a departure from the
fundamental principle that all persons have a duty to use ordinary care
in their conduct to prevent others from being injured.26 The court con-
sidered two policy factors to be critical in denying liability. First, ad-
ministrative considerations, such as the difficulty of proof necessary to
show readily acceptable standards of care for classroom methodology,
militated against liability.27 Second, socio-economic considerations led
the court to conclude that this type of tort claim, if allowed, would
create too great a public burden in time and money.28
Another argument, describing the breached duty in Peter W. as a
mandatory statutory duty under California's Education Code,29 was
dismissed as a misconstruction of the statutes. The court held that the
code sections relied upon by the plaintiff were designed to provide "op-
timum educational results,"3 not to protect against risks of a particular
type of injury.
Finally, the plaintiff argued that tort liability for the school dis-
trict's acts could rest on a theory of intentional or negligent misrepre-
sentation.3' The court dismissed this complaint as improperly pleaded
for failing to allege the requisite element of reliance upon the asserted
persuaded by the "workability" of a rule of care; by the relative ability of the parties to bear the
financial burden of injury; and by the availability of means distributing the loss. 60 Cal. App. 3d
at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
24. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In this case, the California
Supreme Court allowed a departure from liability if certain public policy considerations outbal-
anced the need for protection from injury. The court noted that factors to be considered included:
foreseeability of harm, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between defendant's
conduct and injury, moral blame, prevention of future harm, extent of burden on defendant, con-
sequences to community of imposing a duty of care, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance. Id. at -, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
25. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
W. PROSSER].
26. 69 Cal. 2d at -, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
27. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861. See note 45 infra.
28. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861. See note 45 infra.
29. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West) (repealed 1975) required school districts to keep par-
ents and guardians informed of the educational progress of their children. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 8573 (reorganized as § 51225) (West 1978) forbade a school district from granting a diploma if
certain standards of proficiency were not met. CAL. EDLIC. CODE § 8505 (reorganized as § 51204)
(West 1978) mandated that school districts design courses to meet the needs of the pupils for
which the courses were designed. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1966) states:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is
designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is
liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty
unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the
duty.
30. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
31. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. See also notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text.
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misrepresentation.32 The plaintiff failed to amend the complaint, but it
is reasonable to conclude that a properly pleaded cause of action for
intentional or negligent misrepresentation in a similar case could with-
stand a motion to dismiss. 33 This final dismissal ended the Peter W.
litigation and the educational malpractice issue was temporarily set-
tled.
On July 31, 1978, a complaint similar to that filed in Peter W.
alleging educational malpractice was dismissed by the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School District.34 This decision resembled the earlier Peter W.
finding in California in that it also refused to recognize the cause of
action.3 5 A comparison of the two cases will follow, but one important
distinction should be noted immediately. Donohue contained a dissent-
ing opinion indicating strong judicial interest in the nature of this cause
of action and in the feasibility of future educational malpractice suits.
3 6
The case is on appeal,37 and the recognition of the new tort remains a
possibility.
The plaintiff in Donohue, as in Peter W., was a graduate of a high
school in the defendant school district. According to his complaint, he
was unable to read and write basic English. He claimed that, after
graduation, he found it necessary to be tutored in the fundamental
skills which he believed he should have learned in school. For these
alleged deficiencies, the plaintiff sought to recover $5,000,000 in dam-
ages.38 He based his complaint on two theories of liability. The first
cause of action was in negligence and was similar to the complaint in
Peter W. The plaintiff claimed that the school district owed him a duty
of care to "teach the several and varied subjects .. .; ascertain his
learning capacity and ability; and. . . evaluate his ability to compre-
hend the subject matters . ..[so] as to be able to achieve sufficient
passing grades. . . and therefore, qualify for a Certificate of Gradua-
tion."39 He also asserted that the defendant had breached this duty by
failing (1) to evaluate his ability, (2) to teach him in a manner so that
32. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
33. See the dissenting opinion in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978).
34. 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
35. Id. at 876.
36. Id at 881 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
37. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), appeal
docketed, Judges' No. 249.




Woods: Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Edu
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:338
he could reasonably understand and cope with the subjects, (3) to ad-
vise his parents of his problems, and (4) to "adopt the accepted profes-
sional standards and methods to evaluate and cope with plaintiff's
problems which constitute educational malpractice."40 The second
cause of action in this suit was based upon an alleged breach of a duty
imposed upon the defendant by the state constitution and statutes.
4
The court rejected both complaints and held that no cause of action for
educational malpractice was recognized in New York.42 This suit con-
tained no allegations of intentional or negligent misrepresentation, as
in Peter W., so the court did not address that issue.
Relying on the Peter W. decision and the public policy reasons
stated therein,43 the New York court held that to recognize a cause of
action for educational malpractice would be an impermissible judicial
intrusion into the administration of public schools. 4 The negligence
action was dismissed on the duty issue. The court looked to public
policy factors including moral, preventative, economic, and administra-
tive considerations and concluded as a matter of law that, in this partic-
ular set of circumstances, the defendant did not owe a legal duty of care
to the plaintiff.45 Recognizing that school officials and teachers should
40. Id.
41. Id. at 877. See note 47 infra.
42. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
43. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
44. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
45. Id. at 878.
"Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology af-
fords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science of
pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflictink theories of how or what a child
should be taught, and any layman might-and commonly does-have his own emphatic
views on the subject. The 'injury' claimed here is plaintiffs inability to read and write.
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in schools, or
its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from
outside the teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be phys-
ical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but not per-
ceived, recognized but not identified.
"We find in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of care' against
which defendants' alleged conduct may be measured. . . no reasonable 'degree of cer-
tainty. . . that. . . plaintiff suffered injury' within the meaning of the law of negligence
.... and no such perceptible 'connection between the defendant's conduct and the in-
jury suffered,' as alleged, which would establish a causal link between them within the
same meaning.
"These recognized policy considerations negate an actionable 'duty of care' in per-
sons and agencies which administer the academic phases of the public education process.
Others, which are even more important in practical terms, command the same result.
Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the controversies or incurred the public
dissatisfaction, which have attended the operation of the public schools during the last
few decades. Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with outright failure in
the achievement of their educational objectives; according to some critics, they bear re-
sponsibility for many of the social and moral problems of our society at large. Their
public plight in these respects is attested in the daily media, in bitter governing board
8
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be held accountable for failure to perform their duties reasonably,4 6 the
court was still unwilling to accept the idea of a legal remedy in dam-
ages as a solution to the problem.
In dismissing the claim of a breach of constitutional and statutory
duty, the majority stated that the plaintiff had misconstrued the statutes
and constitutional section involved. Looking at the purpose of these
laws, the court concluded that they were intended to confer free educa-
tional benefits upon the general public and were not designed to protect
against the "injury of ignorance."'47 Donohue further expanded the ear-
lier Peter W. rationale for dismissing educational malpractice actions
by discussing causation as it related to a breach of either the common
law or statutory duties. The court reasoned that numerous other fac-
tors such as innate intelligence and social, emotional, or economic in-
fluences may have caused the plaintiffs illiteracy; therefore, it deemed
the relationship between failing to learn and failing to teach to be too
remote to support liability.48
The dissenting opinion in Donohue is also significant in an analy-
sis of educational malfeasance questions. The dissent, in an extensive
opinion, concluded that Donohue's complaint did state a valid cause of
action.49 It did not consider the policy rationale stated in both
Donohue and Peter W. to be a persuasive argument for dismissal.5"
Rather, the dissent saw the negligence issue as a question of proof to be
resolved at trial.5 Additionally, it concluded that the "floodgate" ar-
elections, in wholesale rejection of school bond proposals, and in survey upon survey.
To hold them to an actionable 'duty of care,' in the discharge of their academic func-
tions, would expose them to the tort claims-real or imagined-of disaffected students
and parents in countless numbers. They are already beset by social and financial
problems which have gone to major litigation, but for which no permanent solution has
yet appeared.... The ultimate consequences, in terms of public time and money,
would burden them-and society-beyond calculation."
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878, quoting Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1976).
46. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The court freely admitted that educators are "ethically and legally
responsible for providing a meaningful public education for the youth of our state," and "may be
held to answer for the failure to faithfully perform their duties. [H]owever, . . . they may not be
suedfor damages'! by a student for failing to learn. Id at 878 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 880. The plaintiff's constitutional complaint was based on a section which stated:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of the state may be educated." N.Y. CONST. art. 1I, § 1. He
further argued that the enabling legislation and compulsory education statutes established the
necessary duty in the school district. Compare 16 N.Y. Educ. Law art. 65 (McKinney 1970) with
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8505 (reorganized as § 51204) (West 1978), 8573 (reorganized as § 51225)
(West 1978), and 10759 (repealed 1975).
48. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
49. Id (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
51. "Whether the failure of the plaintiff to achieve a basic level of literacy was caused by the
9
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gument was without merit. 2 The dissent's second criticism was of the
majority's failure to find a cause of action in the statutory breach com-
plaint. Citing a state commissioner's regulation requiring satisfactory
completion of certain courses as requisite for a high school diploma, 3
it argued that Donohue's transcript could hardly be described as re-
flecting satisfactory completion. This inadequacy, coupled with an-
other commissioner's regulation requiring the school district to take
certain actions if a student was deemed to be a failure or under-
achiever, 4 was considered to establish the necessary statutory duty of
care in the defendant. The dissent also suggested that a cause of action
for intentional misrepresentation might have been appropriately
pleaded in this case."
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
The general theories litigated in Peter W. and Doflohue may still
arise in other courts. Although the California and New York courts
dismissed the issues as a matter of law, the law of torts is not static5 6
negligence of the school system ... or was the product of forces outside the teaching process, is
really a good question of proof to be resolved at a trial." Id (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
52. On this point, the dissent noted:
The fear of a flood of litigation, perhaps much of it without merit, and the possible
difficulty in framing an appropriate measure of damages, are. . . unpersuasive grounds
for dismissing the instant cause of action. Fear of excessive litigation caused by the
creation of a new zone of liability was effectively refuted by the abolition of sovereign
immunity many years ago, and numerous environmental actions fill our court where
damages are difficult to assess. Under the circumstances, there is no reason to differenti-
ate between educational malpractice on the one hand, and other forms of negligence and
malpractice litigation which currently congest out [sic] courts.
407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
53. Compare 8 NYCRR § 103.2, which was in effect at the time of this suit and which stated
general academic standards for granting high school diplomas, with CAL. EDUc. § 8573 (reorga-
nized as § 51225) (West 1978)), supra note 29.
54. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 4404 (McKinney 1970) (amended 1976, 1977). This law was in effect
while Donohue was in school. It required the board of education of each school district to ex-
amine students who failed repeatedly to determine if the child could benefit from ordinary class-
room instruction or needed to be provided with special educational facilities.
55. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). It was further recommended that the case
should have been remanded on a procedural question that the defendant raised concerning the
plaintiff's failure to serve a timely notice of the claim.
The running of the statute of limitations on educational malpractice may prove problematic.
Both Peter W. and Donohue demonstrate that the plaintiff may not realize his injury until after
graduation from high school, the point at which the statute arguably begins to run. It is submitted
that, although the limitation on a suit in contract may begin to run on the date of the agreement,
an action in tort should be governed by a discovery rule similar to medical malpractice. As ap-
plied, that rule would not permit the limitation period to run until the plaintiff knew or should
have known of his injury. See, e.g., Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying
Kentucky law); Tomlinson v. Sieh, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970) (faulty sterilization).
56. As Dean Prosser noted:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the coin-
10
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and educational malfeasance cases may yet be recognized. Several ob-
servations can be made about these two cases which future litigants and
courts must consider as they study the problem of educational malfea-
sance. First, in their negligence analyses, both courts based the failure
to find a workable duty of care on public policy rationale.5 7 Second,
the causation issue58, which was mentioned only briefly in each case,
could present problems in other cases. In addition, neither court ade-
quately addressed the possibility of a misrepresentation cause of ac-
tion.59 Finally, a cause of action for educational malfeasance could be
brought under theories other than negligence or misrepresentation.60
A. Negligence Analysis
1. Duty of Care.
In order to establish a tort of educational malfeasance based on
negligence, the requisite element of duty must be found.61 In his dis-
cussion of duty, Prosser states that its character is artificial in nature;
and since there is no universal test for establishing duty, a court can
easily find it where it desires to do so.6" Further, the essential question
of duty is whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant.63 Because courts have the discre-
tion to look at policy factors to determine the wisdom of declaring such
a common law duty,' another court might take a different view of edu-
cational malfeasance litigation than did Peter W. and Donohue.
Both the Peter W and Donohue decisions reflected public policy
concerns in two major areas: first, fear of over-involvement by the ju-
mon law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has struck out
boldly to create a new cause of action where none had been recognized before. . . . The
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set. When
it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the
conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as
a bar to the remedy.
W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 1, at 3-4. See also McClellan, Clarication ofTort Policy: .4 Com-
parison of the Common Law, Calabresian, and Lasswell-McDougal Approaches to the Resolution of
Tort Claims, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 995 (1977).
57. See notes 61-82 infra and accompanying text
58. See notes 86-98 infra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 110-52 infra and accompanying text.
61. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); James, Scope ofDuty
in Negligence Cases, 47 NEv. U.L. REv. 778 (1953); Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MicH. L. REv.
1 (1953) reprinted in W. PROSSER, SELECTED TopIcs IN THE LAW 191 (1954); Seavey, Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939).
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 53, at 325-26.
63. Id. at 326.
64. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
1978]
11
Woods: Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Edu
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
diciary in the administration of schools if they set standards for learn-
ing that educators themselves have had difficulty formulating;65 and
second, fear of excessive and fraudulent claims that could unduly bur-
den the schools in terms of time and money.66 Ignoring, and thereby
condoning, school district conduct like that occurring in these cases
may be seen by some courts as more damaging to the public interest
than administrative problems or worries of floodgate litigation. Public
policies should be viewed with sufficient flexibility that shifting social
demands may be satisfied.
The fear of over-involvement has been addressed in previous court
decisions concerning educational issues. The Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrguez67 ex-
pressed the concern that its "lack of specialized knowledge and
experience" might interfere with informed educational policy made at
state and local levels of government.68 When faced with issues it is
ready to address, however, the judiciary has quite clearly become di-
rectly involved in the supervision of schools.69 Perhaps educational
malpractice should be such an issue. Although a school district would
certainly be administratively and financially burdened by a $5,000,000
judgment against it, the public interest might be better served if such
liability was imposed. The national publicity surrounding such an ac-
tion would put school districts nationwide on notice that they will be
held accountable for their teaching.7" This would stimulate school sys-
tems to formulate standards of learning as well as to upgrade policies
and procedures. It is difficult to understand why a court would not
become involved with the problem of graduating illiterates when courts
have not hesitated to become involved in internal decision-making in
the past. For example, schools have been required to provide special
programs for the underprivileged7' and have been compelled to bus
students to achieve racially balanced enrollments.72 An over-involve-
ment argument hardly seems appropriate when viewed in the light of
the activist role courts have played in recent years in defining the re-
65. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
66. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
67. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. Id. at 42.
69. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (efforts to
formulate guidelines for implementation of desegregation); Note, Swarn v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd ofEduc., 1 J.L. & EDUC. 134 (1973). See also note 114 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 125-26 infra and accompanying text.
71. See generally THE YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL LAW § 2.2b (1977).
72. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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The fear of excessive litigation and fraudulent claims is an equally
unpersuasive ground for refusing a plaintiff his day in court. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court addressed this issue in Dillon v. Legg74 as it de-
cided the appropriateness of allowing recovery for another new tort.
Arguing against the soundness of a "floodgates"75 theory, the court
stated that meritorious allegations must be heard regardless of the pos-
sibility of fraudulent future claims.76 The facts of each case must be
weighed alone to determine the viability of a cause of action, and fear
of similar suits should not be considered by the court as a legitimate
factor in refusing to hear the action. A primary responsibility of the
courts is to award damages for sound claims, and this duty should not
be abrogated for reasons of administrative convenience.77
It can be argued further that state statutes reflect public policy atti-
tudes requiring that school districts be held responsible for their ac-
tions. For example, in Donohue the state legislature had established
general standards for schools in the Education Code.78 Copiague
School District's questionable compliance with a state regulation re-
quiring a student to complete satisfactorily certain courses before ac-
quiring a high school diploma79 should have been examined at trial.
Another statute requiring that special education provisions be made for
students who fail repeatedly,80 as did Donohue,"' was also violated by
the school district. According to the dissent, this statute alone estab-
lished a duty flowing from the school district to Donohue, and "to dis-
miss the complaint, as the majority proposes, without allowing the
plaintiff his day in court would merely serve to sanction misfeasance in
the education system.""2 The public policy issue need not be consid-
ered at all by the courts when they find a statutory duty. The legisla-
73. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
74. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (negligent infliction of emotional
trauma and physical injury from witnessing daughter's death).
75. Floodgates is a general term referring to the argument expressed at various times by the
judiciary that allowing one particular claim will encourage others to flood the courts with similar
claims. An inference usually accompanies the argument that most of the ensuing claims will lack
merit and will waste the court's time.
76. 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 71. The dissent in Donohue notes that
these fears were also raised before other new forms of malpractice and negligence litigation were
recognized. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). See note 52 supra.
77. 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
78. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1-1501 (McKinney 1978).
79. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 103.2.
80. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404 (McKinney 1970) (amended 1976, 1977).
81. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
82. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
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ture has already expressed public policy by enacting the statute or
providing for the regulation.
2. Breach of Duty
Once the court has recognized a common law or a statutory duty
to educate, the plaintiff must then show that the school district has
breached this duty. The duty is to take reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances to educate students, and the circumstances will include
such things as a student's social and economic environment, aptitudes
and abilities, motivation, and educational resources and facilities . 3
Each of these circumstances may be one factor in a student's failure to
learn. In deciding whether the school district has breached its duty to
educate reasonably under the circumstances, the court must make a
factual determination of what was or was not done for the pupil given
the surrounding conditions. In a case like Donohue, for example, the
plaintiff would allege a breach of duty in the denial of special educa-
tion opportunities which should have been offered him as an under-
achiever.84 Failure to provide alternative methods of teaching or
failure to notify parents of deficiencies in their child's performance 5
are other examples of a breach of the duty to act reasonably under the
circumstances.
3. Causation
The questions to be resolved in determining the issue of breach of
duty are identical to those involved in causation in fact. The causal
relationship between the defendant's acts or omissions86 and the plain-
tiffs harm has apparently confounded the courts. The relationship was
not adequately addressed in either Peter W. or Donohue. The Donohue
court summarized its views of the causation problem when it stated:
"The failure to learn does not bespeak a failure to teach."8 A child's
educational progress, or lack of progress, can be caused by a combina-
tion of factors. Physical and social environment, economic stability,
83. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
84. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
85. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976).
86. Acts of omission or commission can be affirmative conduct for purposes of determining
liability. For example, a train engineer who fails to sound a warning signal is acting affirmatively
for purposes of negligence, even though his action is one of omission. Crowe, The Anatomy of a
Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Ifho Has Been Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 LoY.
L. REv. 903, 904 (1976).
87. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
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motivation from family, and innate ability are examples of components
outside the realm of the school system that can affect a child's learning
ability.8 Weak educational programs and policies, however, must be
considered in assessing a child's skills.89
All events have multiple causes, often numerous and complex. In-
deed, that the plaintiff was born at all is a cause. The initial inquiry,
therefore, is whether the defendant's acts or omissions contributed to
the plaintiffs harm.90 More specifically, in an educational malpractice
88. 124 CONG. REc. S 14862 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (record entry of Sen. Proxmire). See
also Bichrest v. School Dist., 346 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
89. The public seems unsure of where to place the blame for poor academic performance, but
a general belief exists that schools are responsible for many such problems. 124 CONG. REC.
S14862 (daily ed. Sept. I1, 1978).
CBS News produced a three part documentary entitled "Is Anyone Out There Learning?" in
which parents, taxpayers, and educators stated their views on the competence of American
schools. Sen. Proxmire expressed concern over the "fruitlessness of the present Federal school aid
approach" and asked that excerpts from the CBS News broadcast be printed in the Record. The
transcript includes interviews with HEW Secretary Joseph Caliafano, U.S. Education Commis-
sioner Ernest L. Boyd, and other professionals and nonprofessionals interested in education. Ac-
cording to Proxmire, even though the report never focused on the federal government's role in
education, it revealed alarming problems associated with educating children. Id. at S14862.
A poll conducted in conjunction with the programs showed that 41% of the interviewees
believed their children were not receiving as good an education as they had received. Id. at
S14863. When asked their reasons for rating schools poorly, the participants in the program and
the poll named both societal and educational factors. Complaints of poor discipline, inept teach-
ers, and lax promotion policies were mixed with general observations about the permissiveness of
society and the influence of television. See also Gallup - Kettering Education Poll, 106 INTELLECT
268 (1978).
A recent Gallup poll on education also reflected similar concerns with education. Gallup
conducts a yearly poll on educational problems. The following complaints are listed in the order
of frequency mentioned by the people polled in 1977: (1) lack of discipline, (2) integration, segre-
gation, busing, (3) financial support, (4) difficulty getting good teachers, (5) poor curriculum, (6)
drugs, (7) parental lack of interest, (8) size of classes, (9) teachers' lack of interest, (10) mismanage-
ment of funds and programs. This list reflects both society related and school related problems
that affect schools. Id. at 268-69.
90. Crowe, supra note 86, at 904.
The basic concept of early tort law was that if one hurt another, however innocently, he
must make recompense. The concept persisted with slight modification until the late
1700's and is still one of the bastions of tort liability. In its early tort usage, cause was
synonomous with blame, fault, wrongdoing and culpability. These are spongy terms,
each capable of absorbing the meaning of the others, and frequently used interchangea-
bly. The meanings of these terms are still the core of causation doctrines. Causal rela-
tion, causal connection, or cause-in-fact, was only one ingredient of the orthodox cause
concept. In early tort cases this ingredient--the identity of the defendant and causal
connection between his conduct and the victim's injury--did not give rise to troublesome
problems. The chief problem in early tort law was the choice of the proper form of
action-trespass or trespass on the case. The forms of action were based on causation,
i., whether the injury of the victim was the direct or consequential result of the defend-
ant's use of force. The whole of liability was rolled, as it were, into this dual concept of
causation, reflected by appropriate writs to give the common law courts jurisdiction. Al-
though causal relation between conduct and injury was essential to tort liability, it was
the moral content of cause that gave and still gives character to causation doctrines. In
modern tort law, causal relation between conduct and injury has attained a separate and
15
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case, the issue is whether the school district's failure to take reasonable
measures under the circumstances was a cause of the student's ultimate
learning inadequacies. Even though other factors or circumstances
may have contributed to a student's failure to learn,9' the school sys-
tem's breach of its duty to the student in light ofthose conditions may be
found to be the cause in fact of the student's inadequacy.
In short, the determinations of causation and of breach of duty are
intertwined in an educational malpractice case in that both are estab-
lished by the same conduct. This result is neither odd nor unfamiliar to
the common law,92 but the idea is seemingly novel when applied to the
independent status as the beginning point for establishing the liability of a defendant,
and involves no moral content.
Cause, as a basis of liability by virtue of its quality of wrongness, has been fre-
quently expressed in terms of unlawfulness, intent, blame, fault, deceit, negli-
gence--summed up as culpability. Cause has been frequently characterized as direct,
proximate, imputed, presumed, inducing, efficient, active, culpable, and by many other
descriptive terms. Moreover, liability based on the cause concept is frequently qualified
or limited by cause characterized as remote, passive, sole, intervening, independent, su-
perseding, supervening, and similar terms. The causation doctrinal superstructure for de-
termining liability is extensive, refined, complicated in detail, and metaphysical both in
thought and terminology. It was the creation of the nineteenth century during the transi-
tion period from medieval to modem tort law, and designed as a means of limiting liabil-
ity, primarily by the judge as opposed to a jury. As a basis for the adjudication of
litigated tort cases it has had a weird history and has resulted in great confusion of legal
theory, endless, and arid legal disquisition, and many injustices to litigants.
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42, 42-43 (1962) (footnotes omitted,
emphasis in the original). See also Green, The CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MicH.
L. REV. 543 (1962).
91. See notes 87 & 88 supra and accompanying text.
92. A pertinent analogy can be made to the common law tort involving a rescue. Like a
victim in danger of drowning, an uneducated person finds himself to be in peril from the outset.
Just as there is no duty to rescue at common law, there is no inherent duty requiring a school
system to educate. However, a duty to rescue may be imposed upon a rescuer by statute, a special
relationship between the parties, or an attempted rescue. See generally J. RATCLIFF, THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (1966); Comment, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MoD. L. REV.
241 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rescuers]. In addition, after performance has clearly begun, there
can be no doubt that there is a duty of care imposed. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 56, at 346. A
similar duty (to educate) has been incurred by the school district. See notes 61-82 supra and
accompanying text. In rescuing the hypothetical drowning victim above, the rescuer may be met
by high winds, waves, tides, and deep water. In attempting to educate the initially ignorant child,
a school system may be similarly confronted with barriers and obstacles that impede its progress.
There is no duty to succeed in educating a student just as there is no duty to succeed in saving a
victim. Both rescuer and educator must, however, act reasonably under the circumstances. The
rescuer beaten back by the waves does not breach his duty any more than does a school system
that fails to overcome a child's serious learning diability. If, however, the rescuer has a rope at
hand and fails to use it, or educators have educational alternatives available and do not use them,
an action for negligence arises. It is the defendant's failure to act reasonably under the circum-
stances, thereby breaching an established duty, that is the actual and proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's failure to be saved from his peril.
This analogy is drawn in order to demonstrate that the framework for a tort of educational
malfeasance is not new. It is identical to that traditionally applied by the common law to situa-
tions involving rescue. See generally Bohien, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Scheid, Affrmative Duty to Act in Emergency Situa-
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issue of educational malfeasance.
Since many variables affect a student's academic skills, the issue of
causation in fact will surely arise in an educational malpractice claim.
The plaintiff will need to provide empirical evidence of damage9 3 to his
educational progress and to show his injury to be a result of the defend-
ant's breach of its duty.94 Since these variables in any one case would
present a question upon which reasonable people may differ, the ques-
tion would be one of fact for a jury to decide.95
Once a breach of duty and causation in fact have been established,
proximate cause 96 presents no obstacle to the negligence analysis.
Under any of the accepted tests, such as foreseeability or substantial
factor,97 the proximate cause element undoubtedly would be satisfied.
It is unquestionably foreseeable that a school district charged with the
responsibility of taking reasonable measures to educate its pupils will
damage those students when it breaches this duty. Alternatively, a
school district's breach of its established duty is certainly a substantial
factor in the resulting harm to the student. The proximate cause issue
is intimately related to causation in fact, duty, and breach of duty.
Once the policy requiring liability has been established,98 it should not
be difficult to connect a legal, or proximate, relationship between the
defendant's acts and the plaintiff's harm.
4. Harm
In order to satisfy the required elements of a negligence tort, the
plaintiff must always prove that some damage was suffered. 99 A stu-
dent in an educational malpractice case will need to show some harm
such as an inability to secure and hold employment due to his lack of
ions-The Return o/the Good Samaritan, 3 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 1 (1969); Note, The Duty to
Rescue, 47 IND. L.J. 321 (1972). For cases establishing a duty to rescue imposed by a special
relationship, see, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948) (employer-em-
ployee); Pacific Atlantic SS. Co. v. Hutchison, 242 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1957) (ship-seaman). Even
without this relationship, some courts have begun to recognize conduct which could be considered
nonfeasance to be misfeasance. Comment, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. REV. 241,
243 (1971). See also Comment, The Bad Samaritan: Rescue Reexamined, 54 GEO. L.J. 629, 630-
35 (1966).
93. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 41.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. For a general discussion of proximate cause and its relation to duty and foreseeable risk,
see W. PROSSER, supra note 25, §§ 31, 42, 43, 44. See also James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE
L.J. 761, 783-811 (1951).
97. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 42.
98. See notes 23-28, 61-82 supra and accompanying text.
99. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 30.
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basic skills. Perhaps, as in Donohue, compensation for the cost of a
tutor could be claimed."l° Damages might also include the plaintiff's
lost wages attributable to time spent in his attempting to remedy defi-
ciencies caused by the school district's malfeasance.' 0 '
Although both the Peter W. and the Donohue courts refused to
recognize the tort of educational malfeasance, it has been shown that
the elements of negligence can be satisfied in such an action. 0 2 A de-
fendant school district that causes harm to a student by breaching its
duty to take reasonable measures to educate should be held liable for
its negligence; and, as in any other negligence tort, the plaintiff should
be compensated for his damage.10 3
B. Misrepresentation
A complaint of intentional or negligent misrepresentation is a pos-
sible basis for an action for educational malpractice which should be
explored further. The plaintiff in Peter W. failed to plead the requisite
element of reliance,' 0" and the plaintiff in Donohue chose not to plead
this cause of action at all.10 5
A student who has been repeatedly promoted and has been re-
ported to be working at or near grade level in basic academic skills 0 6
should be able to charge the schools with misrepresentation when he
100. 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
101. Damages for mental and emotional disturbance and embarrassment, even though the
harm is no doubt present, would probably not be permitted. See generaly W. PROSSER, supra
note 25, § 54. But see Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 410 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (App. Div. 1978) (plaintiff
recovered $500,000 for diminished intellectual development and psychological injury).
102. As the dissent in Donohue pointed out:
[Tihe negligence alleged in the case at bar is not unlike that of a doctor who, although
confronted with a patient in a cancerous condition, fails to pursue medically accepted
procedures to (1) diagnose the specific condition and (2) treat the condition, and instead
allows the patient to suffer the inevitable consequences of the disease. Such medical
malpractice would never be tolerated. At the very least, a complaint alleging same would
not be dismissed upon motion. In the case at bar, the plaintiff displayed, through his
failing grades, a serious condition with respect to his ability to learn. Although mindful
of this learning disability, the school authorities made no attempt, as they were required
to do, by appropriate and educationally accepted testing procedures, to diagnose the
nature and extent of his learning problem and thereafter to take or recommend remedial
measures to deal with this problem. Instead, the plaintiff was just pushed through the
educational system without any attempt made to help him. Under these circumstances,
the cause of action at bar is no different from the analogous cause of action for medical
malpractice ...
407 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
103. The fundamental premise is that one is liable for damage caused by his fault and that "a
tortfeasor must pay compensation for all damages caused by fault, even by mere negligence."
Tunc, Tort Law and the Moral Law, 30 CAMB.'LJ. 247, 249 (1972).
104. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
105. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
106. This was the basic factual background of the plaintiff in Peter IW.
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discovers after graudation that he is a "functional illiterate."' 7 The
schools have a responsibility to keep the parents and students accu-
rately informed of the student's progress. Conversely, parents and stu-
dents have a right to know if they are not meeting standards set by the
schools. The record of the plaintiff in Peter W. revealed average grades
and no indication of his later-discovered inadequacies."0 ' Even though
the plaintiff in Donohue had knowledge of some of his deficiencies be-
cause of poor grades, he still received a diploma reflecting satisfactory
completion of high school.0 9 Grades, test scores, and diplomas are
typically indicators-to the parents, students, and anyone interested that
the student meets a level of competence and knowledge in relation to
certain criteria established by a school or educational body. A school,
therefore, which inaccurately represents a student's competence and
educational progress should be held responsible for any damage to the
student resulting from reliance on that misrepresentation.
C Alternative Actions
Although the two causes of action discussed above are still possi-
ble avenues of redress for future plaintiffs, other bases for liability
should also be considered including breach of contract, infringement of
a constitutional right, and violation of section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act.' 10
The contractual relationship between a student and an educational
institution has previously been a subject for litigation.' One plaintiff
was a university student who sued to recover her tuition and expenses.
She contended that the university did not provide the course for which
she had registered and that they should be held liable to her for a
breach of contract.' 2 The implied contractual relationship was alleg-
edly established when the plaintiff paid her registration fees for a
course described in the university's bulletin."' A plaintiff suing a pub-
lic school may need to rely on such factors as compulsory education
statutes and school regulations describing standards or courses in order
to claim a contractual relationship.
107. This is a commonly used term in education meaning that a person can read and write
only at a very fundamental level.
108. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
109. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
I11. Hammond, Understanding the Parameters ofAcademic Fraud, NASPA J., Fall, 1975, at
28.
112. Id. This case, while drawing wide attention, is apparently unreported.
113. Id. at 31.
1978]
19
Woods: Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Edu
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:338
In light of a recent judicial trend towards recognizing students'
rights, 114 an alternative cause of action might be brought based on the
fourteenth amendment." 5 The school's failure to educate would be an
alleged confinement without due process of law. 16 Under a system of
compulsory education, the rights of the students and parents must be
balanced against the right of the state to govern the instruction in
schools."1T A school's power to require student attendance without pro-
viding substantial benefits should not go unchallenged." 8 Education
should prepare a child to enter society as a self-sufficient and self-reli-
114. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Note, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise Clause Prohibits Compulsary Education of Amish
Children, 4 Loy. U.L.J. 256 (1973); Note, The Amish Exception: A Constitutionally Conelled
Exception?, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 274 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 Gco.
L.J. 37 (1970). A consent decree in Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying, 343 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), held that a school
may not constitutionally exclude children by classifying them as "uneducable" in the face of over-
whelming evidence that all children can learn to some extent. See generally D. SCHIMMEL & L.
FISCHER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS (1975); McClung, Do Handicapped Children Hla'e a
LegalRight to Minimaly Adequate Education?, 3 J. L. & EDUC. 153 (1974); Comment, The Hand-
capped ChildHas a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976); Note, Constitu.
tionalLaw-The Children's Crusadefor ConstitutionalRecognition, 78 W. VA. L. REV.192 1975-76.
115. Theories have been advanced under both the equal protection and the due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) held that handicapped children have a
right to public education because the equal protection clause requires that all children be provided
with an education. See also In re Peter H., 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Fam. Ct. 1971).
One commentator has observed that "the real issue is not equality, but quality." The Right to
Education, supra note 5, at 810. That article also reviews the due process analysis. Id at 807-09.
See also McClung, The Problem ofthe Due Process Exclusion: Do Schools Have a Continuing
Responsibility to Educate Children with Behavior Problems 3 J.L. & EDUC. 491 (1974).
116. Comment, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 711 (1978).
For a criticism of the confinement argument based on compulsory attendance, see The Right to
Education, supra note 5, at 807-09. Nevertheless, that author favors a cause of action based on
substantive due process and finds that
there is something fundamentally irrational in compelling a parent to send his child to
school if evidence indicates that the school fails to teach him. If the justification for
compulsory education is the parental duty to educate the child, and if the parent can
demonstrate that enrolling his child in public school will not achieve that purpose, com-
pulsory attendance becomes a cruel hoax at the child's expense. At the very least the
substantive due process theory calls into question the constitutionality of compulsory
education for many children.
Id. at 809.
117. Rights ofChildren, supra note 116, at 714. Every state but Connecticut has a provision in
its state constitution for the establishment of a public school system. The Right to Education,
supra note 5, at 797 n. 11. See generally Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The QuietRevolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1973); Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 3 (1955). For a general discussion ofthe scope and powers of local school boards, see
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and
Status: A Non-ConstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
118. See generally Comment, Schools and School Districts-Doe v. San Francisco Unified
School District, Tort Liabilityfor Failure to Educate, 6 LoY. U. L.J. 462 (1975).
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ant individual. 119 A system of compulsory education that fails to pro-
vide those benefits violates a student's right to educational
development. 20
Another federal remedy could be sought under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. 2 ' The scope of liability for public officials is a pres-
ent controversy in the courts,' 22 and school officials have been held
subject to section 1983 liability where they knew, or should have
known, that their actions violated a student's rights. 23 The present cli-
mate of increasing judicial awareness of the civil rights of students' 24
provides fertile ground for litigating an educational malpractice issue
under section 1983.
IV. RECENT TRENDS: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPETENCY-BASED
EDUCATION
Public discontent has caused educational policymakers to institute
major reform programs in American schools.' 25  Legislatures and
school officials have responded to the general public complaint of un-
satisfactory schools by initiating programs of accountability and com-
petency-based testing. 26 These reform movements, though designed to
strengthen the performance of school systems, could potentially pro-
119. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
120. Rights of Children, supra note 116, at 697-99. A compulsory system which fails to educate
has a deleterious effect on society as much as on individual students. "It is, therefore, incumbent
upon the school to provide students with the instruction and environment necessary to enable
them to realize their intellectual potential." Id. at 697.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any, State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
122. Comment, Immunity of Teachers, School Administrators, School Board Members, and
School Districts From Suit Under Section 1983 of Civil RightsAct, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1129 [herein-
after cited as Immunity of Teacher's Under Section 1983]. See also Yudof, Liabilityfor Constitu-
tional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 So. CAL. L. REv. 1322 (1976); Note,
School Board Members'"immunityfrom Section 1983 Suits-Wood v. Strickland, 29 ARK. L. REv.
554 (1976); Note, Official Immunityfrom Damages in Section 1983 Suits: Wood v. Strickland, 56
ORE. L. REV. 124 (1977).
123. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
124. See generally Immunity of Teachers Under Section 1983, supra note 122. See also Com-
ment, Suability ofSchool Boards andSchoolBoardMembers, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 181 (1972); The
Rights of Children, supra note 116. But see Bichrest v. School Dist., 346 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (school district not "person" within meaning of the statute).
125. L. BROWDER, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, AN ADMINISTRA-
TOR'S HANDBOOK ON EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ADMINIS-
TRATOR'S HANDBOOK]. See also Accountability, Competency Testing, Back to Basics: Symposium,
62 NASSP BULL. 1 (1978).
126. See generally ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK (1975), supra note 125 (accountability); 59
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vide meaningful evidence in malpractice litigation. 127  Educators
should be forewarned of the powerful latent effect of accountability
and competency-based education (CBE)128 movements on their liabil-
ity for failure to educate.
Educational accountability involves holding educators both re-
sponsible and answerable for the "educational outcome" of their stu-
dents.1 29  President Nixon is generally credited with beginning this
reform movement when he stated that school administrators and teach-
ers should be held accountable for their performances.1 30 Nixon
openly challenged schools to improve their standards when he claimed
that American education is in urgent need of reform.' 31 School dis-
tricts across the nation responded with reforms that came to be known
as the accountability movement. 32
One of the most significant aspects of the accountability movement
has been the development of defined performance criteria both by local
school districts and by state educational policymakers.' 33 Measurable
goals are replacing broad, abstract rhetoric which had comprised edu-
cational bbjectives in the past.134 For example, policymakers have
transformed generalized expectations that schools teach children to
read and to do arithmetic into objectives evidencing specific reading
and mathematical abilities.13 5 Performance expectations are written to
reflect a consenus of what schools should be accomplishing. 36
One state, for example, has recently passed an Educational Ac-
countability Act 137 requiring school districts to establish high school
graduation standards and requiring programs of pupil progression
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 585 (1978) (special issue focusing on minimum competency testing move-
ment).
127. R STRICKLAND, supra note 1, at 64.
128. CBE is the shortened form for "competency-based education," the currently popular
phrase for this education reform movement. See Reilly, Competency-Based Education: Pros and
Cons, 14 AM. EDUC. 21 (1978).
129. ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 5-6. See also Carried, Who Is Ac.
countable in the Schools?, 45 CONTEMP. EDUC. 19 (1973). "[T]he concept means that a teacher or
school could be called to task for not meeting agreed upon objectives." Id.
130. ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 10; R. STRICKLAND, upra note 1, at
63.
131. ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 10; R. STRICKLAND, supra note 1, at
63.
132. ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 9-10.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Wise, supra note 12, at 356.
135. Often termed "behavioral objectives," they are written by school personnel, local com-
munity members, and/or state legislators. See ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at
16.
136. Wise, supra note 12, at 356.
137. Florida has been developing programs and laws committed to educational accountability
[Vol. 14:338
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(promotion) to be based on performance. The two basic themes of the
law are the elimination of social promotion and educator accountabil-
ity for education programs. 138 This type of legislation is an attempt to
appease the dissatisfied public, but school administrators, board mem-
bers, teachers, and legislators should beware of potential legal liability
which could attach to a failure to meet self-imposed standards.
Courts may perceive accountability statutes as providing the nec-
essary duty 139 and causation in fact elements 4 ° in future educational
malpractice litigation. Plaintiffs can argue that these statutes reflect a
public desire to hold schools accountable for adherence to certain mini-
mum standards. This policy of defining school responsibility can be
seen as a public willingness to establish a legal duty of care upon which
liability can be based. In Peter W., the court argued that judicial rec-
ognition of a legal duty of care is to be dictated by public policy and
that a major determinant of this public policy is whether the particular
injuries in question are comprehensible and assessable.' That court
reasoned that no duty existed because there were no readily acceptable
standards of care in the case at hand; 42 however, an accountability,./
statute could have provided the necessary standard. Accountability
standards provide a means for identifying and correcting serious short-
comings in public schools. The public has set the standards, and
schools that fail to meet them should be held legally responsible for
their insufficiencies.
Another currently popular reform in American education is com-
petency-based education (CBE). 43 CBE is essentially a test-oriented
program in which state or district-mandated proficiency tests are used
to decide if students will be promoted or graduated. Proponents of
CBE maintain that a high school diploma will gain some needed stat-
ure if tests are used to control who is promoted and graduated.'" A
school district using a CBE program is basically guaranteeing that its
since the late 1960's. This latest act passed unanimously. FLA. STAT. § 229.814 (1977). See also
Fisher, Florida's Approach to Competency Testing, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 599 (1978).
138. See generally Fisher, supra note 137, Florida's Approach to Competency Testing, 59 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 599 (1978).
139. See notes 61-82 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 86-98 supra and accompanying text.
141. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
142. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
143. See note 128 supra.
144. Reilly, Competency-Based Education:L Pros and Cons, 14 AM. EDuc. 21 (1978). Propo-
nents also claim that test results can be used to prod students and unproductive teachers, that they
aid in distributing funds where needed, and that the public will better understand the schools. Id.
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students who earn diplomas have acquired certain minimum skills.' 45
The popularity of this movement can be seen in a recent poll in which
eighty-two percent of those polled favored requiring a passing score on
standardized tests before graduation. 14 6
As of March 15, 1978, thirty-three states had mandated some type
of minimum CBE standards. 47 At the federal level, a bill was intro-
145. Spady, supra note 144.
146. 124 CONG. REC. S 14863 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978). See generally notes 88 & 89 supra and
accompanying text.
147. A coded summary of that activity follows:
KEY
1. Action taken
2. Setting of standards
3. Grade levels assessed
4. Skill areas assessed
5. Use of standards and test
6. Comments
* State department of education t State board of education
Alabama-l. State board resolution, 1977. 2. SDE* 3. 9-12 4. Basic skills 5. For H.S.
graduation 6. State supt. of educ. has appointed a committee of 100 to study and make
recommendations on standards, the test, and H.S. diploma issue; due July 1, 1978.
Arizona-l. SDE ruling 2. SDE; assessment by local district; no statewide test prescribed
3. 8 and 12 4. Reading, writing, computing 5. For grad. from grades 8 & 12 6. Effective
Jan. 1, 1976, students to read, write, compute at grade 6 level to receive standard grade 8
certificate; at grade 9 level for H.S. diploma. Calf/ona-I1. Early exit test (SB 1112-1972;
SB 1243-1975; SB 1502-1976) 2. Test and cut-off standards set by SDE 3. Age 16 to adult
4. Process areas: reading, computing; content areas: consumer economics, math 5. Award
H.S. diploma and leave school with parent permission 6. Title of program: California
High School Proficiency Test; test administration and security handled under contract
with private testing corporation.
1. AB 3408, Ch. 856-1976 2. State board to supply performance indicators, exam-
ples of minimum standards; local dists. set graduation standards. 3. Once, 7 to 9; twice,
10 to 11 4. Reading, writing, computing 5. For H.S. graduation 6. Act also prescribes
course of study requirements; in effect for the graduating class, 1980.
1. AB 65, Ch. 894 2. Local dists. 3. Once, 4 to 6; once, 7 to 9; twice, 10 & 11 4.
Reading comprehension, writing, computing 5. For remediation and grade promotion
decisions 6. This law is to move California into elem. grade testing. Colorado-l. SB
180-1975, C.R.S., 22-32-109.5 2. Local boards 3. Twice a year, 9 to 124. Local dist. op-
tion 5. Local dist. option for H.S. graduation 6. If local bd. imposes a proficiency test for
H.S. graduation, it must follow stipulations of this act. Conneticut-1. SBEt resolution,
Nov., 1977 (early exit program) 2. SDE, using existing GED and APL test standards 3.
Age 16 4. Academic: GED test; life skills: APL (Adult Performance Level) test 5. With
counseling and follow-up teaching, students can leave school with H.S. equivalency di-
ploma. 6. Final implementation contingent upon $300,000 appropriation from legisla-
ture in 1978. Delaware-l. SBE resolution, 1976 2. SDE after baseline test is given 3.
Baseline instrument in grade 11, 1978 4. Level II competencies; i.e., applications of read-
ing, writing, math 5. For H.S. graduation 6. Contract to develop baseline testing instru-
ment awarded to private test maker. Florida-l. CSSB 340, 1975; Fla. Statute 229.814.
CSSB 107, 1976; F.S. 76.226 2. State and local boards 3. 3, 5, 8, 114. Basic skill areas;
functional literacy 5. For high school graduation, grade promotion and early exist from
high school 6. Titled: Educational Accountability Act. Places ban on social promotion.
Georgia-I. SBE action 2. SBE and SDE 3. 4, 8, 114. Grades 4 & 8; reading math, social
studies, science. H.S. test under development 5. SBE has not taken final action on use of
the tests. 6. Student assessment program is part of long-range, comprehensive plan; local
districts to get funding for program. Idaho-l. SBE resolution 2. SBE 3. 9-12 4. Read-
ing, writing, arithmetic, spelling 5. For H.S. graduation at option of local districts 6.
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duced in the 1978 session of Congress which would have created a Na-
Student passing proficiency exam will get diploma with state board seal. In districts not
participating, students to get district diploma. Indiana-l. SBE resolution, Feb., 1978 2.
By local dists. with advisory committee of teachers, administrators, parents, community
members 3. 3, 6, 8, 10 4. Reading 5. Primarily for remediation; local districts may use for
other purposes. 6. Rules & regulations for this resolution await attorney general and
governor's approval (March 14, 1978). Kansas-l. SBE ruling, Jan., 1978 2. SDE will set
standards, goals with help of local dists. 3. 3, 6, 9, 12 4. Academic skills: reading and
math., grades 3, 6, 9; life skills: grade 12 5. Local district option 6. Pending legislation has
good chance of passing in 1978; could alter some aspects of SBE mandate. Kentucky-1.
BE adopted 4-yr. competency plan, 1977 2. SDE with task force assistance 3.3, 5, 8, 11
4. Criterion-referenced tests in reading, writing, arithmetic 5. For H.S. graduation, grade
promotion 6. -. Louisana-l. HB 810, Act 709, 1976 2. State supt. of schools 3. 4, 8,
11 4. Basic communication and computing skills with criterion-referenced tests 5. No
mention of graduation or grade promotion 6. Requirements are part of accountability
and assessment law. Afaine-I. Amends LD 1810, Ch. 78, Private Special Laws 2. SDE
3. 11 4. (See comments) 5. For H.S. graduation 6. Law requires statewide committee to
help commissioner of education in developing assessment instrument, designating areas
to be tested; names organizations to be represented. Maryland-l. HB 1433, M.A.C.,
Art. 77, Sec. 980, 1976; and HB 1462, C . 559, 1977 2. SBE 3. 2 to 12; 3, 7, 9, 11 4.
Reading 5. For grade promotion and H.S. graduation 6. Students not meeting minimum
requirements may be retained in grade or enrolled in remedial program. Michigan-I.
SDE 2. SDE 3. 4, 7, 10 4. Reading and math 5. For local district use 6. Twelfth-grade
minimum competency test covering life-role skills under study. Missouri-1. SBE 2.
SDE 3. 8 4. Application of reading, math, government/economics skills 5. No mandate
for graduation or grade promotion 6. Basic Education Skills test, developed by SDE, has
been field tested in grades 8, 10, and 12. Nebraska-l. SDE 2. Local districts 3. Begins
in 5, continues until mastery achieved in each skill area. 4. Reading, writing, math 5.
State-developed test is not to be used for grade retention or promotion 6. Local districts
may use Nebraska Assessment Battery of Essential Learning Skills (N-ABELS) or de-
velop own test. Nevada-l. AB 400, 1977 2. SBE 3. 6, 9, 12 4. Reading, writing, math 5.
For H.S. graduation 6. Students may be promoted to next grade if fail exam, but reme-
dial work is to be provided. New Hampshire-1. SDE 2. SDE 3. 4; 8, 12 under develop-
ment 4. Communications and math 5. Grade promotion and H.S. graduation not
menioned& Program is to provide guidelines for local districts. New Jersey-l. A.1736,
Ch. 97, 1976 2. State 3. - 4. Reading and math 5. Student diagnosis and remedial
identification 6. Local districts are to provide remedial assistance in order for students to
meet state standards.
I. SDE 2. SDE 3. 3, 6, 9, 11 4. Reading and math; life skills under study 5. Identifi-
cation of students needing instructional help 6. Development of testing instrument is
under contract to private test development company. New fexico-l. SBE 2. State 3.
10; at elem. level, choice up to local district 4. Elem.: local option; secondary: proficiency
battery based on adult APL and writing sample 5. Proficiency endorsement on H.S. di-
ploma if test is passed 6. The SDE is working on a series of basic skill-area curriculum
guides. New York-l. State Board of Regents 2. State Board of Regents 3.9-12 4. Read-
ing and math with a criterion-referenced tests; civics, citizenship, practical science,
health, drug education, writing, language skills 5. For H.S. graduation 6. The SDE also
administers Regents Diploma Program and Pupil Evaluation Plan (PEP), both related to
measuring student performance in basic skills. North Carolina-l. HB 204 2. Compe-
tency Test Commission created by law 3. 11, beginning in 1978-79 4. To be determined
by Competency Test Commission; see comments 5. For H.S. graduation 6. Test is to
measure "those skills and that knowledge thought necessary to enable an individual to
function independently and successfully in assuming the responsibilities of citizenship."
1. HB 205 2. By Competency Test Commission (separate from HB 204 commission)
3. 1, 2 (criterion-referenced test); 3, 6, 9 (norm-referenced test) 4. To be determined by
the Competency Test Commission 5. To be determined by the Competency Test Com-
mission 6. . Oregon-I. SBE, 1972 2. Local districts 3. District option 4. Reading,
writing, computing; local option for personal development, social responsibility, career
development 5. For H.S. graduation 6. Graduation requirements are based on course
credit, attendance, and required competencies in personal, social career areas.
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tional Commission on Basic Education to establish federal standards
for minimal competency. 48 Politicians and educators have responded
with a flurry of legislation designed to improve the quality of educa-
tion, with the responsibility for implementing these requirements and
standards resting at the local level.'49 It is in this implementation proc-
ess that a school now has more responsibility upon which its liability
could be based.
As with accountability, CBE laws can arguably be viewed as fulfil-
ling the duty 5 ° and causation'-" requirements for a negligence action.
Judicial response to a school's failure to comply with CBE require-
ments is difficult to predict since the laws are a new phenomenon in
most states. Nevertheless, the potential for liability seems to be greater
than in the previous Peter W. and Donohue cases where statutes with
Oklahoma-l. SBE 2. Decision will follow baseline data test 3. 3, 6, 9, 12 4. Reading (3,
6, 9); survival skills (12) 5. Decision will follow baseline data test 6. Baseline test instru-
ment given to 15,000 students in fall, 1977. Rhode Island-l. SDE 2. - 3. 4, 8, and
age 17 used in pilot test 4. Comprehension, analysis, evaluation (known as "life skills")
5. For local district and SDE use; competency-based H.S. diploma under study 6. Rhode
Island master plan for evaluation and statewide assessment program have jointly con-
tributed to pilot testing in life-skills areas. Tennessee-l. SBE, Nov. 10, 1977 2. SDE 3.
11, 12 4. Reading, math, grammar, spelling 5. For H.S. graduation, class of 1982 6. Two
different programs were established in the same court ruling.
1. SBE, Nov. 10, 1977 2. Local districts 3. 4, 5, 6, 8 4. Subjects at discretion of local
districts 5. Remediation 6. - Utah-l. SBE, Jan., 1977 2. Local districts 3. Local
district option 4. Reading, writing, speaking, listening, arithmetic, democratic govern-
ance, consumerism, problem solving 5. For H.S. graduation, class of 1980 6. Local dis-
tricts will choose test and set cut-off standards. ermont-I. SBE 2. SBE 3. Continuous
4. Reading, writing, speaking, listening, math; area of reasoning under study 5. For H.S.
graduation 6. Mastery of basic competencies to be one requirement for graduation unless
student has handicap. Virginia-l. SBE ruling 2. Broad: state. Specific: local 3. - 4.
Functional literacy in communicative skills; computing skills, history and cultures of
U.S., including processes of democratic governance and economic system; ability to pur-
sue higher education or gain employment 5. For high school graduation, class of 1981,
and remediation 6. It is assumed that local districts will choose grade or grade levels to
test. State mandates that it be done before graduation.
1. HB 256, 1976 2. SBE in cooperation with local districts 3. All yearly, with first
emphasis in K-6 4. Reading, communications, math 5. To measure progress of individ-
ual students 6. Authorization known as Standard of Quality Act. Washington-l. SB
3026; HB 1345, 1976 2. Local districts 3. 4, 8 4. Reading, math, language arts, using
standardized achievement tests 5. For school district and parent use 6. School districts
are encouraged to develop separate test for grade 2 for early identification of pupils
needing assistance in language and computation. Wyomng-l. SBE policy 2. Local dis-
tricts will establish specific standards 3. - 4. Reading, writing, computing with profi-
ciency; process and structure of democratic governance and free enterprise 5. For H.S.
graduation 6. Start-up date, rules, regulations are to be determined by SDE. Local dis-
tricts will verify state standards and are encouraged to go beyond minimum standards set
by SBE.
Pipho, Minimum Competency Testing in 1978. A Look at State Standards, 59 PHi DELTA KAPPAN
585, 587-88 (1978).
148. H.R. 9574, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978).
149. Pipho, supra note 147, at 587-88.
150. See notes 61-82 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 86-98 supra and accompanying text.
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only generalized educational goals were in effect. 152
V. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that educational malpractice will continue as a
subject for judicial consideration. A frustrated public continues to seek
the ultimate solution to the problem of declining effectiveness of
schools, and the courtroom provides an avenue for redress to dissatis-
fied parents and students. Situations such as those in Peter W and
Donohue should not exist. Schools must be held responsible to stu-
dents who, like the'plaintiffs in these cases, attended and progressed
through twelve years of schooling, earned a diploma, and then were
unable to secure and sustain employment because of their poor aca-
demic backgrounds.
A trend towards holding schools responsible for their students'
learning can be seen in accountability and CBE movements. No court
has yet addressed the educational malpractice issue in a jurisdiction
with accountability or CBE statutes. Arguments that can be made in
support of holding school districts liable will be substantially strength-
ened if a statute of this type applies to the defendant school district.
The time is right for judicial intervention in upgrading educational
standards. Malpractice by school districts cannot be allowed to con-
tinue. The courts are proper arbiters, and dismissal of such actions
only perpetuates the status quo. If schools are to continue to be respon-
sible for the general education of children, they must be held to this
duty and must be liable for its breach.'53
Nancy L Woods
152. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862; 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
153. "It is incumbent upon us [as educators] then to seize this 'opportunity' irrespective of its
origin, not to obfuscate nor philosophize, but to demonstrate that education is a profession willing
to set standards and, furthermore, willing to be held accountable if those standards are not met."
Saretsky, supra note 16, at 592.
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